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tax consequences under the 1995 ruling.  Specifically, it
may be wise to consider slowing the increase in cash value
so that it accrues over a longer term.  That postpones equity
attainment.  Also, it may be possible to avoid a taxable
transfer under I.R.C. § 83 by providing for a substantial risk
of forfeiture on the part of the employee.  A taxable transfer
does not occur if the interest has not vested.17  Vesting
could be tied to attainment of performance objectives by the
employee (or reaching a specified number of years’
service).
In conclusion...
The last word has clearly not been written on the tax
treatment of split-dollar life insurance contracts.  Further
guidance from the Internal Revenue Service is to be
expected.  Moreover, the Service position is likely to be
challenged in court.
FOOTNOTES
1 For a discussion of the taxation of life insurance
generally, see 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 43.02[2]
(1996); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 5.01[4] (1996).
2 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11.
3 Id.  See Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23.
7 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9604001, Sept. 8, 1995.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11.  See also
Rev. Rul. 55-747, 1955-2 C.B. 228.
13 Ltr. Rul. 9604001, Sept. 8, 1995.
14 I.R.C. § 83(a).
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
16 Ltr. Rul. 9604001, Sept. 8, 1995.
17 I.R.C. § 83(a).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a contestant in a horse
show and had ridden her horse up to the arena entrance but
was prevented from entering by a mass of people. The
defendant was also an entrant and had stopped nearby for
the same reason. A horse exiting the arena was forced to
walk close to the defendant’s horse and bumped the
defendant’s horse, causing it to rear and kick the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued for damages under negligence and strict
liability theories. The defendant argued that La. Rev. Stat. §
9:2795.1 provided immunity from the suit. The statute
provided immunity from liability for an “equine activity
sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person.” The
court held that the defendant was within the class of
persons provided with immunity from liability. The
plaintiff argued that the exception in the statute for willful
or wanton disregard for the safety of others applied because
the defendant should have known that the defendant’s horse
would kick if bumped. The defendant testified that the
horse had not kicked anyone before but that it was common
knowledge that horses could become frightened if their
“comfort zone” was invaded. The court held that the
incident was within the range of dangers associated with
equine activities and held that the defendant did not commit
willful or wanton disregard for the plaintiff’s safety.
Gautreau v. Washington, 672 So.2d 262 (La. Ct. App.
1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtors owned 78 acres of rural
land. The debtors’ home was situated on 2 acres, 76 acres
were contiguous woodlands, and 3.5 acres of the woodland
were used as a residence by the debtors’ adult daughter and
her children. The home site and woodlands were assessed
together for property taxes but the 3.5 acres were assessed
separately. The 3.5 acres were not included as security for a
loan used to buy the entire 78 acres. The court held that the
debtors were entitled to a rural homestead exemption for
their home site and the woodlands but not for the 3.5 acres
used as a residence by the daughter. The court noted that
the woodlands qualified as rural property even though the
debtors did not use the land for agricultural purposes,
because the land was clearly rural in nature and the state
exemption statute did not require that a rural homestead
property be actively used for farming or other agricultural
purposes.  In re McCall, 195 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1995).
PRIORITY. During the debtor’s Chapter 12 case, the
county assessed property taxes against the debtor’s
property. The debtor converted the case to Chapter 7. The
county sought seventh priority status for the tax claim
under Section 507(a)(7). The court held that when the taxes
were assessed a lien was automatically created by Ark.
Code § 26-34-101 and the taxes became a secured claim.
The court held that Section 507(a)(7) allowed a priority
only for unsecured governmental claims; therefore, the
county’s claim would have to be paid from its security and
could not receive priority. In re Wrigley, 195 B.R. 914
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
VALUATION. The issue in this case was the valuation
of the debtors’ farm real and personal property to determine
the amount of the FmHA (now FSA) secured claim in the
property. The court discredited both the FmHA in-house
appraisal and the debtor’s personal appraisal of the property
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and used values which were the average of both values. In
re Fuller, 196 B.R. 41 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE. The IRS filed a
claim in the debtor’s Chapter 11 case for unpaid taxes for
1977 through 1985 when the debtor filed accurate income
tax returns but did not pay the amounts due. The
Bankruptcy Court held that the taxes were dischargeable
because the debtor filed accurate returns and did nothing to
prevent the IRS from collecting the taxes, such as hiding
assets. The District Court reversed, holding that no
fraudulent act need be committed by the debtor in order to
deny discharge under Section 523. The court held that the
debtor’s failure to pay the taxes was a willful attempt to
evade taxes because the debtor knew the taxes were due
and the debtor had the ability to pay the taxes. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the knowing failure to
pay taxes did not alone constitute a willful attempt to evade
taxes. On remand, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 plan,
providing for full payment of the secured tax claims over
the life of the plan but only 2 percent on the unsecured
portion of the tax claims which were determined to be
dischargeable under the above ruling. During the
proceedings above, the debtors paid a portion of their post-
filing wages into an escrow account. The plan provided for
use of those funds for payment of unsecured claims. The
IRS objected to the plan and the debtors sought
confirmation under Section 1129(a)(8). The IRS argued
that Section 1129(a)(8) confirmation “cramdown” was not
available to the debtors because they would retain an
interest in estate property without providing new value to
the estate. The debtors argued that the escrow funds were
new value contributed to the estate and that the estate
property was retained by the debtors only because the
property was exempt. The court confirmed the plan.  In re
Haas, 195 B.R. 933 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996), on remand
from, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'g, 173 B.R. 756
(S.D. Ala. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor timely filed accurate 1986,
1987, 1988 and 1989 income tax returns but did not make
any tax payments. In 1988, the debtor filed a no asset
Chapter 7 case, a second Chapter 13 case was filed in 1991
and finally the current no asset Chapter 7 case was filed in
1995. The IRS argued that, under Section 108(c) and I.R.C.
§ 6503(h), the first two bankruptcy cases tolled the three
year period of Sections 507(a)(7)(A)(i) and 523(a)(7)(B)
such that the taxes were not dischargeable under those
sections. The court held that the plain language of Section
108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h) indicates that those laws do not
apply to bankruptcy provisions. The court noted a
significant split in the cases on this issue. The court noted
that the IRS had over 1,000 days to collect the 1986, 1987,
and 1988 taxes and 343 days to collect the 1989 taxes when
the debtor was not involved in a bankruptcy case; therefore,
the IRS was not equitably entitled to suspension of the
Section 507(a)(7) time period. In re Turner, 182 B.R. 317
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d on reconsideration, 96-2
U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,351 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
LEVY. The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 13
case. The first case was dismissed by a court order which
provided that the trustee retain an amount to cover
expenses and pay the remainder of the bankruptcy estate to
the debtor. The IRS filed a notice of levy against the trustee
after the dismissal order and before the funds were repaid
to the debtor and the trustee held the funds pending the
outcome of this case. The court determined that the funds
held by the trustee were subject to the levy once the first
case was dismissed. In re Schlapper, 195 B.R. 805
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
CONTRACTS
PROMISSORY NOTE. The defendant was a peanut
farmer who had purchased one type of peanut seed for
several years until a poor harvest because of disease. The
defendant purchased a disease resistant variety from the
plaintiff who claimed that the seed was capable of 88
percent germination. However, the actual seed purchased
contained some uncertified seed. The defendant
experienced reduced yields and obtained a refund of the
seed price from the producer. The defendant sought a loan
from a bank which refused to make the loan because of a
large amount on account with the plaintiff. The plaintiff
agreed to take a promissory note at reduced interest and to
tell the bank that the account was satisfied. The bank made
the loan but the defendant returned the money and rented
out the land. The plaintiff sued to recover the amount owed
on the promissory note. The defendant argued that the note
was void because it was made without consideration from
the plaintiff. The court held that the reduced interest rate,
extended term for payment and agreement to tell the bank
the account was satisfied were sufficient consideration. In
addition, the court held that the defendant as the
accommodation party cannot assert lack of consideration
since the value the defendant received was what the
defendant bargained for. The defendant also argued that the
contract was void because of illegality since the plaintiff
misrepresented to the bank that the account was paid. The
court held that this defense was not available to the
defendant because the defendant participated in the
misrepresentation. Morey v. Brown Milling, 469 S.E.2d
387 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
EMPLOYMENT
BREACH OF LOYALTY. The defendant was
employed as the manager of a farm supply store owned by
the plaintiff. The defendant became dissatisfied with the
employment and solicited another chemical company to
establish a store in the same area, using the defendant’s
property and the defendant as manager. When that
agreement was reached, the defendant informed the other
employees of the move and suggested that they follow him.
All of the other employees left for the new store within a
month after the defendant resigned and the plaintiff lost 70
percent of its business which followed the salesmen to the
new store. The plaintiff sued for breach of employee
loyalty and appropriation of trade secrets, the customer
information. The plaintiff received a jury award of $75,000
but awarded the defendant $37,000 bonus compensation
due under the old employment contract. None of the
employees had signed any noncompetition agreement. The
court upheld the award of damages for the plaintiff because
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the defendant actively solicited the other employees while
the defendant was still employed by the plaintiff. The court
reversed the award of the bonus because the employment
contract made the bonus discretionary with the plaintiff.
The court held that no actionable appropriation of trade
secrets occurred because the employees took no written
records and the information about the customers was easily
obtained from the customers. Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Crisp,
82 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
EMERGENCY LIVESTOCK ASSISTANCE. The
CCC has adopted as final regulations changing the
designation of the Emergency Livestock Assistance
regulations from Part 1475 to Part 1439. 61 Fed. Reg.
32643 (June 25, 1996).
HERBICIDE. See Schuver v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 546 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 1996) under
Products Liability infra.
TOBACCO. The FSA has issued a notice of
determination of penalty rates for nonquota tobacco:
Type Cents per pound
Flue-cured..................................................134
Burley ........................................................139
Fire-cured (Type 21)..................................122
Fire-cured (Types 22 & 23) .......................163
Dark Air-cured...........................................132
Virginia Sun-cured ....................................115
Cigar Filler & Binder.................................109
Puerto Rico Cigar-filler ...............................57
61 Fed. Reg. 32425 (June 24, 1996).
The CCC has adopted as final regulations requiring a
refund on a CCC loan on “nested” tobacco whether or not
the producer knew the tobacco was nested. 61 Fed. Reg.
33303 (June 27, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent died in May 1995 and the will
created an irrevocable trust funded with the residuary
estate. The surviving spouse was the sole beneficiary of the
trust, which was QTIP. The will provided that the trust
terminated on the death of the surviving spouse and the
trust corpus passed to a trust with one share for each
surviving child, each surviving grandchild and for the
grandchildren of a pre-deceased grandchild. The surviving
spouse amended the spouse’s will to provide that any estate
and death taxes imposed on property passing under the trust
by reason of the spouse’s death were to be paid from the
spouse’s probate estate. The will also provided for
additional property from the spouse’s estate to be included
in the trust shares to the extent of any unused GSTT
exemption amount. The IRS ruled that the will provision
for paying taxes resulting from the passing of the trust
shares did not subject the trust to GSTT. The trusts would
be considered as partially exempt from GSTT to the extent
of corpus passing from the decedent’s original pre-
September 25, 1995 trust and partially subject to GSTT to
the extent of property passing to the grandchildren’s shares
from the surviving spouse. Ltr. Rul. 9627020, April 8,
1996.
The decedent died in 1970 and the decedent’s will
established an irrevocable trust for the surviving spouse
with equal remainders to the decedent’s two children and
final remainders to the children’s descendants. The trust
was funded with stock and the corporation wanted to elect
Subchapter S treatment. In order for the trusts to qualify as
QSSTs, the trustee sought a construction of the trust in state
court that the shares held by the children will be considered
as separate trusts. The final remainder holders or their legal
representatives disclaimed their interests in the trust which
had not vested at the time of the disclaimers. The IRS ruled
that only the disclaimers of the minor children would be
timely made and that the disclaimers of the adult
descendants of the children would constitute gifts. The gifts
would constitute additions to the trust and subject a pro rata
portion of the trust to GSTT. The IRS also ruled that the
state court construction of the trust provisions would not
itself subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9627010, April
3, 1996.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* The taxpayer established three
irrevocable trusts, only two of which were at issue in this
ruling. In both trusts, a child of the taxpayer was the
primary beneficiary and one of three co-trustees, all of
which were children of the taxpayer. The trusts granted the
taxpayer’s grandchildren, their spouses and their issue the
right to withdraw contributions to the trust by the end of
each calendar year. The trusts did not require the taxpayer
or the trustees to notify the beneficiaries with withdrawal
rights that any contributions were made. In 1990, the
taxpayer made contributions to the trusts on December 31
but the taxpayer’s attorney sent letters notifying the
beneficiaries of the contributions on December 27. Banking
rules prohibited crediting the trusts’ accounts until January
2, 1991. On December 10, 1991 the taxpayer’s attorney
sent letters to the beneficiaries that contributions to the
trusts were made; however, not until December 31, 1991
was a check dated December 26, 1991 deposited in the
trusts’ account. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was not
entitled to a gift tax exclusion amount for contributions to
the trusts because the withdrawal rights were shams since
the failure of the taxpayer to make contributions within
sufficient time to make the withdrawals indicated that the
beneficiaries had agreed not to exercise the withdrawal
rights. Ltr. Rul. 9628004, April 1, 1996.
IRA. The decedent’s will bequeathed the residuary
estate to a trust for the surviving spouse with remainders to
the decedent’s children. The residuary estate included three
IRAs owned by the decedent. The surviving spouse
disclaimed an interest in the trust equal to the value of the
IRAs and the children disclaimed any remainder interest in
the disclaimed interest. Thus, an amount equal to the value
of the IRAs passed by intestacy to the surviving spouse and
the executor funded the intestacy bequest with the amounts
in the IRAs. The surviving spouse deposited the funds in an
IRA in the spouse’s name. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were effective, the IRA funds were treated as
passing directly to the surviving spouse and the surviving
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spouse did not need to include the IRA funds in gross
income. Ltr. Rul. 9626049, April 2, 1996.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent had received an interest in trust from the
decedent’s pre-deceased spouse’s estate which had
qualified as QTIP. The predeceased spouse’s estate claimed
a marital deduction for the QTIP trust interest. The trust
failed to provide that any income received by the trust
during the period between the last distribution and the
decedent’s death (so-called “stub” income) was to be paid
to the decedent’s estate. The decedent’s estate argued that
because of this, the trust was not QTIP and the trust was
not includible in the decedent’s gross estate. The court
noted disagreement in the courts as to whether the “stub”
income must be payable to the spouse’s estate in order for a
terminable interest to be QTIP and held, therefore, that the
statute was ambiguous on that point. After discussing the
legislative history and the practical consequences of the
two interpretations, the court held that the failure of the
trust to require the “stub” income to be paid to the spouse’s
estate did not disqualify the trust as QTIP.  Estate of
Shelfer v. Comm’r, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,238
(11th Cir. 1996).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that, until revised
forms are published in October 1996, the current versions
of the following forms are to be used: Forms 706, 706-A,
706-NA, 709, 709-A. Ann. 96-62.
VALUATION. The taxpayers, husband and wife, each
owned a 50 percent tenancy in common interest in their
personal residence. Each taxpayer created an irrevocable
trust and contributed their 50 percent share of the house to
the trust. The trusts provided that the taxpayers could use
and occupy the house for 15 years, at which time the
taxpayers’ children became the beneficial owners of the
trusts. The trust allowed the taxpayers to lease the residence
from the trusts at fair rental value after the 15 years. The
trust provided that, if a taxpayer died before the 15 years
passed, the taxpayer’s interest in the trust passed to the
taxpayer’s estate. The taxpayers executed wills bequeathing
each’s interest to the surviving taxpayer. The IRS ruled that
the trusts were qualified personal residence trusts for
purposes of I.R.C. § 2036 and that if a taxpayer survived
the 15 years, the interest in the trust was not included in the
taxpayer’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9626041, April 2, 1996.
After the decedent had been diagnosed for cancer with
less than a 5 percent chance of recovery, the decedent
amended two family partnership agreements to allow the
transfer of partnership interests and to have the decedent’s
son made managing partner at the decedent’s death. The
decedent transferred remainder interests in the decedent’s
partnership interests to trusts for the decedent’s children in
exchange for $250,000 and annuities payable over the
decedent’s life.  The remainder interests were valued using
the actuarial tables of Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f) (Table A)
for a person of the decedent’s age. The annuity agreement
had a provision that the remainder interest purchasers
agreed to increase the amount to be paid if the remainder
interests were revalued by the IRS or Tax Court. The Tax
Court originally held that the remainder interests could not
be valued using the actuarial table because of the limited
life expectancy of the decedent. The savings clause was not
effective to change the fact that the purchasers had paid less
than fair market value for the remainder interests and that,
therefore, the transfers were includible in the decedent’s
estate as gifts under I.R.C. § 2036 but offset by the
$250,000 actually paid. The appellate court remanded the
case to determine whether the holding was consistent with
Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, which required that
death be “clearly imminent” before the actuarial table could
not be used. On remand the Tax Court reiterated its belief
that the case precedents established a clearer standard but
held the decedent’s death at the time of the transfer was
clearly imminent since testimony demonstrated that the
decedent’s chance of surviving for more than one year was
less than 10 percent. Est. of McLendon v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-307, on remand from, 77 F.3d 477 (5th Cir.
1995), rev’g without op., T.C. Memo. 1993-459.
The decedent owned undivided partial interests in a
ranch, other real property and a pleasure boat. The other
undivided interests were owned by a QTIP trust established
for the decedent by the decedent’s predeceased spouse. The
trust assets were includible in the decedent’s estate. The
estate claimed that the value of the undivided interests
should have been discounted for the partial interests owned
by the decedent. The IRS argued that the decedent’s fee
simple interests in the properties merged with the trust
interests in the properties so that the decedent would be
treated as owning the entire interest in each asset for
valuation purposes. The court held that the undivided
interests held by the decedent could be valued at a discount
because the decedent had no control over the trust assets at
death and the trust assets were not subject to estate tax until
after the decedent’s death. Bonner v. United States, 84
F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996) . An article on this case by Neil
Harl will appear in a future issue of Agric. Law Digest.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a
shareholder in several corporations which owned and
managed commercial properties. The taxpayer did not
receive any wages from the corporations. The taxpayer
incurred travel and other expenses in overseeing the
corporations’ businesses but did not seek reimbursement
from the corporations for these expenses. The court held
that the taxpayer could not claim the expenses as a business
deduction because the expenses were incurred as an
employee. Cavalaris v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-308.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS. The
taxpayer’s parent corporation acquired clean farm land
which became contaminated with pesticides and chemicals
when the land was used as an industrial waste site. The
taxpayer, a subsidiary, donated the land to the county
which attempted to convert the land to recreational use
until the contamination was found and then the county
resold the land back to the taxpayer for nominal
consideration. The taxpayer was responsible for the cleanup
of the land and sought to deduct the costs of legal fees for
negotiating with the EPA, consulting fees for determining
the amount of waste, and consulting fees for determining
114                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
the cleanup required, as ordinary business expenses under
Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. The IRS initially ruled
that Rev. Rul. 94-38 did not apply because the land was not
clean when the taxpayer reacquired the land. The IRS also
initially ruled that the costs were capital costs not eligible
for current deductions because the land was no longer used
in a trade or business. On reconsideration, the IRS ruled
that the costs were deductible because the taxpayer caused
the pollution while owning the land and no further
contamination occurred during the break in ownership. The
costs were allowed as current deductions because none of
the fees created or produced an asset or produced a long-
term benefit for the taxpayer. The second ruling did not
discuss the issue of whether the expenses were associated
with a trade or business but the allowance of the deductions
appears to indicate that the IRS found that the land was
held by the taxpayer as a trade or business, either from the
original use of the land as a industrial site or intended
future use.  Ltr. Rul. 9627002, Jan. 17, 1996, revoking,
Ltr. Rul. 9541005, Sept. 27, 1995. An article on this ruling
by Neil Harl will appear in a future issue of Agric. Law
Digest.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
taxpayers sold a residential property on an installment
contract. The taxpayers had their income tax return
prepared by a tax preparation firm which failed to follow
the taxpayers’ directions to report the gain from the sale on
the installment method. The lengthy return was not
completed until the day for filing the return and the
taxpayers signed the return before discovering the error the
next day. The tax preparer immediately attempted to obtain
an extension of time to file the installment method election
but was required to file a private letter ruling. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayers would be allowed an extension of
time to revoke the election out of the installment method
because the error was committed by a preparer, the error
was discovered early, immediate steps were taken to
correct the error and the taxpayer always intended to report
the gain on the installment method. Ltr. Rul. 9627019,
April 8, 1996.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION. The taxpayers’
principal residence was destroyed by a fire. The taxpayers
received insurance proceeds for the lost personal and real
property and used a portion of the proceeds to purchase and
remodel another existing residence. The proceeds were also
used to purchase personal property. The IRS ruled that the
real properties were sufficiently similar to qualify for gain
deferral but refused to rule on the factual issue of whether
the personal property purchased was sufficiently similar to
the personal property lost. Ltr. Rul. 9627018, April 5,
1996.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer sold a principal
residence and began constructing an addition to an existing
building which had been and continued to be rented to
unrelated tenants at fair rental value. The addition included
a bedroom, family room, two bathrooms, a kitchen, a
garage and a driveway. The IRS ruled that the construction
of the addition qualified as a new residence for purposes of
I.R.C. § 1034 deferral of gain. Ltr. Rul. 9626020, March
26, 1996.
S CORPORATIONS
TRUSTS. The decedent died in 1970 and the decedent’s
will established an irrevocable trust for the surviving
spouse with equal remainders to the decedent’s two
children and final remainders to the children’s descendants.
The trust was funded with stock and the corporation wanted
to elect Subchapter S treatment. The trustee sought a
construction of the trust in state court that the shares held
by the children would be considered as separate trusts in
order for the trusts to qualify as QSSTs. The final
remainder holders or their legal representatives disclaimed
their interests in the trust which had not vested at the time
of the disclaimers. The IRS ruled that the trust was a QSST
while the surviving spouse was the beneficiary and the
equal shares held by the children would be QSSTs if the
proposed state court construction was obtained.  Ltr. Rul.
9627010, April 3, 1996.
TIMBER. The sole issue in this case was the age at
which pine timber becomes merchantable. The taxpayer
presented testimony of two independent appraisers and
three employees as to the merchantability of pine timber at
10 years of age. The IRS did not provide any rebuttal
evidence or attempt to discredit the taxpayer’s witnesses.
The court held that pine timber becomes merchantable at
10 years of age. MHC Properties, Inc. v. U.S., 96-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,347 (W.D. La. 1996).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
CONVERSION. The plaintiff owned land leased to a
tenant on a grazing lease. The tenant, however, sold native
grass seed on the land to the defendant. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for conversion of the grass seed. The trial
court awarded the plaintiff damages for the loss of value of
the land after the conversion and damages for bringing the
suit to recover the property. The defendant argued that the
damages in the first part were limited to the sales price of
the seed. The court held that, under 23 Okla. Stat. § 64, the
plaintiff was entitled to damages equal to the loss of land
value because the plaintiff sought recovery with due
diligence. The court reversed the second damage award,
however, because the plaintiff’s counsel failed to provide
specific evidence of the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff
in pursuit of the property, excluding legal fees incurred to
prosecute the action, which were not allowed by the statute.
Ross v. Kan-Tex Seed Co., 914 P.2d 1085 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1996).
MORTGAGES
REDEMPTION PERIOD . The defendant had
borrowed money from the plaintiff and granted a mortgage
on some of the defendant’s farm land. The defendant
defaulted on the loan and the plaintiff brought a foreclosure
action. The land was sold and the plaintiff purchased the
land at the sale and brought an action for the deficiency
amount. The plaintiff obtained a deficiency judgment and
three other parcels of the defendant’s land were sold in
satisfaction of the judgment. The trial court granted the
defendant only a six month redemption period on the first
sale because the defendant had paid less than one-third of
the loan amount before the foreclosure. The redemption
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               115
period was amended to three months before the second sale
and the trial court allowed only a three month redemption
period for the second sale. The defendant argued that the
second sale was not governed by the shorter period in the
redemption statute because no mortgage remained and the
first sale proceeds paid more than one-third of the loan
amount. The court held that the normal 12 month
redemption period applied to the second foreclosure sale
because no mortgage existed at the time of the sale and no
default occurred because the deficiency judgment was
executed upon three days after it was entered. Farm Credit
Bank of Wichita v. Zerr, 915 P.2d 137 (Kan. Ct. App.
1996).
NEGLIGENCE
OBSTRUCTION OF CREEK. The plaintiff was a
soybean farmer through whose land ran a creek. The creek
flooded on occasional heavy rains. The creek flowed
through the defendant’s property. The defendant placed an
obstruction across the creek on the defendant’s property
causing the flooding of the plaintiff’s land to increase from
five to 15 acres. The plaintiff sued for negligence for the
loss of the additional 10 acres of soybeans lost from a
heavy rain while the creek was blocked. The plaintiff
provided unrefuted evidence of the amount of normal
flooding, the average yield of the flooded acres, the price
the lost soybeans would have been sold at (using the
average price of the sale of the harvested beans), and the
cost of production of the lost soybeans which was not
incurred because of the flooding. The trial court found that
the defendant caused the blockage of the creek and that the
blockage caused the additional flooding. The court awarded
damages based on the yield of the 10 acres times the
average market price for beans less the costs of production
saved. The state District Court reversed, holding that the
damages were too speculative and not based on expert
testimony. The appellate court reinstated the trial court’s
judgment, holding that the trial court had discretion to
accept the plaintiff’s testimony as sufficient to prove the
elements of damages, especially where the defendant failed
to provide any refutation of the evidence. Bristol v.
Rasmussen, 547 N.W.2d 120 (Neb. 1996).
PARTNERSHIPS
FIDUCIARY DUTY. The defendant was a corporation
formed for the purpose of acquiring and operating an
orchard. The orchard chosen for the purchase included four
parcels, one of which was 56 acres. The defendant signed a
contract to purchase the orchard land, paid earnest money
on the agreement and agreed to make a downpayment at
closing.  Before the closing, the defendant approached the
plaintiffs for the sale of the 56 acres but the plaintiffs
wanted to purchase the land with the defendant in a
partnership. The plaintiffs agreed to contribute an amount
equal to the agreed purchase price to the partnership with
the intent that the partnership make the purchase of the 56
acres. The defendant used the contributed funds to make
the downpayment on the entire orchard purchase but did
not inform the plaintiffs that the money would be used this
way or that the defendant would be making a profit on the
transactions. The plaintiffs sought an accounting and a
share of the profits made on their part of the purchase and
the entire land purchase. The court held that because the
partnership was formed before the orchard land was
acquired by the defendant, the defendant owed a fiduciary
duty to the plaintiffs as partners to inform them of the true
nature of the transactions; therefore, the entire orchard land
became a partnership asset and the plaintiffs were entitled
to an accounting of all profits. Chang v. Century
Orchards, Inc., 915 P.2d 425 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff purchased the herbicide
Preview, manufactured by the defendant, for application on
the plaintiff’s soybean fields with the belief that the
herbicide would not carry over to the next year’s corn crop.
However, the next year’s and the following year’s corn
crops showed herbicide carry over damage. The plaintiff
sued the manufacturer in negligence and strict liability and
the defendant claimed preemption of the suit by FIFRA.
The plaintiff provided evidence that the carryover effect
was caused by a high pH of the soil in the area. The
plaintiff’s negligence claims alleged that the defendant was
negligent in marketing in an area inappropriate for the
herbicide and in failing to withdraw the product once the
high pH of the area soil was known, in testing the product
to determine whether it was compatible with the area’s soil,
and in failing to warn the area farmers of the problem.
Similar allegations were used to support the strict liability
claim. The court held that the action was preempted by
FIFRA because the plaintiff’s claims were merely another
way of stating that the defendant failed to warn on the label
of the carryover effects in areas with high pH soil. Schuver
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 546 N.W.2d 610
(Iowa 1996).
PROPERTY
UNLAWFUL DETAINER. The defendant had granted
a mortgage on a farm to a bank. When the defendant
defaulted on the loan the bank began foreclosure
proceedings which, after several bankruptcy filings by the
defendant, finally ended in the sale of the property to the
bank. After the sale, the parties had several discussions
about the defendant repurchasing the farm or leasing the
farm. The evidence was contradictory as to whether any
agreement was reached. The jury found that no oral lease
was entered into by the parties and reached a verdict for the
bank to eject the defendant for unlawful detainer. The
defendant also challenged the jury instruction on the
elements of unlawful detainer because the instruction did
not require a finding that the defendant’s continued
possession was willful and unlawful. The court
acknowledged that the jury instruction was incomplete but
held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the defect
because another jury instruction gave the jury an
opportunity to determine whether the defendant’s holding
over was pursuant to an oral lease agreement. In addition,
the court noted that the closing arguments made the
requirement of unlawful and willful holding over necessary
for a verdict of unlawful detainer. Agribank FCB v. Cross
Timbers Ranch, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996).
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST. The
debtor borrowed money from a bank in order to purchase a
farm tractor. The bank claimed to have mailed a UCC-1
form with the filing fee to the county recorder. The bank
provided no evidence that the form or check was received
by the recorder’s office or that the recorder’s office
mishandled the filing. The bank argued that the mere
mailing of the form and fee was sufficient filing to perfect
the security interest in the tractor. The court acknowledged
that there is some precedent for allowing perfection where
the recorder received but did not correctly file the security
interest, but the court held that the creditor must provide
evidence of receipt of the filing before that rule could be
applied. The court refused to hold that the mailing of the
form and fee was sufficient presumption of filing to perfect
the security interest. The court also rejected the bank’s
request to allow perfection of the security interest under the
theory of unjust enrichment to the other secured creditors
who will now receive a priority interest in the tractor. The
court held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not
apply where the bank’s failure to properly perform a
perfection resulted in the benefit to other creditors who
were not aware of the benefit until the bankruptcy of the
debtor. For the same reason, the court refused to apply
equitable subordination to give the bank a priority security
interest in the tractor. In re Wright, 196 B.R. 97 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1995).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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